The details of the policy were intricate. Identifying which devices represented a true threat compared to those that could still be marketed was complicated. Estevez remembers the White House advocating for wider limitations, while the Commerce Department, concentrating on economic advancement, preferred a more defined strategy. “Attempting to restrict China is a pointless endeavor,” Raimondo, the commerce secretary, expressed to The Wall Street Journal toward the close of Biden’s tenure, referring to export restrictions as mere “speed bumps” for China.
Nonetheless, the administration forged ahead. Former officials pointed out Chhabra’s bureaucratic expertise and resolve in carrying out the chip agenda. “American technology must not assist adversaries in creating AI capabilities that could be directed against American personnel, strategic resources, and vital infrastructure,” asserts Chhabra, currently at Anthropic, stressing the necessity of robust export regulations for national security and leadership in AI.
It is typical for scholars with innovative policy concepts to join the government, but infrequent for their ideas to be rapidly adopted. “Look, Tarun and I had disagreements all the time,” Estevez notes, yet “the issue wasn’t moving in the same direction.” The fundamental dispute revolved around whether to restrict China and how—broad limitations compared to targeted actions that would allow more flexibility for the industry.
Achieving the correct equilibrium has proven difficult. Following initial limitations in October 2022, the administration determined that additional restrictions were necessary. Nvidia was prohibited from selling its leading AI training chip to China, yet subsequently created a new chip that tested the boundaries of current regulations. In October 2023 and December 2024, the administration stiffened regulations on chips and chip fabrication equipment to seal perceived gaps.
For success, the administration required collaboration from Japan and the Netherlands. Keeping advanced chips from China was a focused endeavor, but obstructing China’s efforts to develop advanced chips was a collaborative international pursuit. Semiconductor production relies on global precision machinery and software, with crucial contributions from the Dutch firm ASML and Japanese companies like Tokyo Electron. If the US curtailed its equipment suppliers from selling to China, but Japan and the Netherlands continued, US firms would lose income, and China could still make strides in its manufacturing.
The administration sought early cooperation from Japan and the Netherlands but encountered holdups. The White House implemented the 2022 controls before obtaining allied backing, mindful that it would affect US enterprises. They then persuaded Tokyo and Amsterdam that participation would be beneficial despite export losses and potential repercussions from China. Estevez, having spent decades at the Defense Department, recognized the future of AI in military operations. He understood that military strategists preferred to contend with a technologically backward China. This viewpoint resonated with allied leaders. “The sales pitch to the Dutch and the Japanese was: Artificial intelligence is the future,” Estevez recounts. “And they bought that.”
